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Adequate Protection Under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
By DONALD PRICE*
INTRODUCTION

In 1970, Congress created the Commission of the Bankruptcy
Laws' of the United States. Its purpose was to study and recommend changes in the existing bankruptcy law which had been enacted in 1897 and which, except for the Chandler Act of 1938,2
had resisted major revisions. The Commission's work resulted in
the new Bankruptcy Act of 19783 (Act) which effected fundamental substantive and procedural changes in bankruptcy laws.
Despite the changes, the classic confrontation between trustee
and secured creditor continues because of two basic conflicts. The
first and most fundamental conflict occurs when the trustee,
through his or her avoidance powers,4 attempts to invalidate the
transfer of security from the debtor to the creditor. The second
conflict occurs when the trustee proposes to retain and use the collateral in which the secured party has an interest.
Successful invalidation of the transfer precludes the second conflict. However, for the purposes of this Article, it will be assumed
that the trustee's attempts to invalidate or avoid the transfer of
security from the debtor to the creditor were unsuccessful so that
the creditor now has a lien valid in bankruptcy. The creditor will
expect to enforce the lien and to realize the expectations he had
when he entered into the secured transaction, specifically the rights
to repossess the collateral and foreclose upon its lien.

Associate Professor of Law, Temple University.
The Commission became operational in June 1971, and filed its final report with
Congress on July 30, 1973. Its product did not become law until November 1978.
2 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, cl. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-99) as amended by the
Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (codified in sections of 11 U.S.C. (1976) (repealed
1979)).
3 The new act is codified in 11 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981).
4 The trustee's avoidance powers are set forth in 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547-49 (Supp.
V 1981).
5 Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] embodies the creditor's expectations that he will be able to repossess the collateral and foreclose
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In many chapter 116 and chapter 137 reorganization plans,
the debtor must be able to use the collateral in order to be rehabilitated, and it is here that the battle lines are drawn. The filing
of the bankruptcy petition by the trustee triggers the automatic

stay of section 362,8 which prohibits the secured creditor from
repossessing and authorizes the trustee to retain and use the col-

lateral under section 363. 9 The continuation of the stay and the
retention and use of the collateral are conditioned upon the trustees
ability to provide adequate protection of the interests of the secured
creditor. 0
This Article will examine the policy considerations behind the

adequate protection concept, the legislative intent embodying that
policy and the judicial treatment of both.
I.

LEGISLATIVE POLICIES AND INTENT
REGARDING ADEQUATE PROTECTION

The Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws faced two major
problems when it was formed in 1970. First, the existing statutory
scheme was inadequate to administer the increasing number of
cases." Second, there was a perceived inadequacy of relief for

upon the lien. See § 9-503 wherein a creditor's right to repossess is set forth and §§ 9-504
and 9-505 which set forth the creditor's right to dispose of the collateral after repossession
and foreclose the debtor's interest.
6 Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act governs reorganizations.
7 Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act governs adjustment of debts of an individual
with regular income.
8 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. V 1981). This section stays most creditors' attempts to collect. Specifically, § 362(a)(3) stays attempts to repossess.
9 11 U.S.C. § 363 (Supp. V 1981) authorizes the trustee, within certain defined limitations, to use, sell or lease property of the estate. Such action would of course affect
a secured creditor if its lien encumbered the property.
10 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (Supp. V 1981). The text of this subsection requiring adequate
protection is set forth in note 20 infra. Actions by the trustee constituting adequate protection are described in 11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981). See text accompanying note 68
infra. For a detailed treatment of § 361, see notes 20-48 infra and accompanying text.
1 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5965. Consumer credit became a way of life following the enactment
of UCC Article Nine. This codification of a uniform, relatively simple set of laws governing the secured transaction gave creditors the protection they never had before, thereby
permitting the number of these transactions to burgeon. The greatest protection, of course,
is the right to repossess without notice which is set forth in § 9-305.
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consumer debtors.' 2 The answer to the plight of the consumer
debtor was the enactment of chapter 13" of the Act, which provides the consumer a fresh start 14 but is meant to be used only as
a last resort. 15 The Act, however, contains strong protection for
consumer creditors and the means to effectuate that protection. 16
17
As such, the Act is not considered a "debtor's bill.'
With respect to commercial credit, the Act reflects practical
considerations. The policy clearly is to give a business the opportunity to work out its problems under the guidance of a trustee.
If the business survives, the interests of owners, employees and
creditors are served. At the same time, the drafters of the Act recognized the need to adequately protect the rights of secured creditors'8 and thus keep the flow of credit open.

A.

The Reasons for an Adequate Protection Requirement

In the world of commercial credit under the prior bankruptcy laws, the equities seemed to be balanced against the secured
creditor, whose collateral was retained by the trustee for use in

12 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5966.
13 See note 7 supra.
14 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6079.
15 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6078. In fact, chapter 13 has become, if anything, the "Chapter of
First Resort." Among other reasons, the more liberal discharge provisions of § 1328(a)
(although not the "hardship" discharges under § 1388(G)) have made chapter 13 the primary
avenue for consumer debtor relief and, consequently, the subject matter of much creditor
and lender criticism. Congress is under increasing pressure to amend chapter 13 and to
redesign its discharge provisions to match those of chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. § 727 (Supp. V 1981).
16 The most significant creditor protection section is § 1325(a)(5) of the Confirmation of Plan requirements. Here it is provided that the court will deny confirmation of
the plan unless the debtor insures full payment to secured creditors of their "allowed secured
claims." Hence, even though chapter 13 permits modifications of secured claims without
creditor consent, the actual impact on the creditor is minimal. Furthermore, § 1322(c),
in all but extraordinary situations, prohibits plans to extend beyond three years. The
cumulative effect, the guarantee of full payment to a secured creditor in three or fewer
years, is not likely to differ dramatically from the contractual obligation as unaffected
by bankruptcy.
17 See H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5966.
18 Id.
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reorganizational proceedings. 19 The lack of a specific statutory
provision protecting the secured creditor's interest necessarily
resulted in ad hoe court decisions providing little guidance to creditors, debtors or trustees. The Commission's response was section
363 of the Act which specifically authorizes the use, sale or lease
of the secured creditor's collateral, but only upon a showing that
the creditor's interest is "adequately protected." = Since the use
of collateral is an inherent aspect of nearly all chapter 11 and 13
proceedings, the enactment of section 363 was perceived as fundamental to the effectuation and operation of the Act's broad reorganization provisions.
In addition to the practical concerns leading to a statutory standard of protection, the concept of adequate protection is derived
from the due process clause of the fifth amendment. That clause
protects against the abridgment of property rights without just
compensation despite the public purpose of the taking.2' When
faced with the impairment of a mortgage lien in bankruptcy, the
United States Supreme Court, in Louisville JointStock Land Bank
v. Radford,22 stated:
The bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive
powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment. Under
the bankruptcy power Congress may discharge the debtor's personal obligation, because unlike the States, it is not prohibited
from impairing the obligation of contracts .... But the effect

of the Act (Bankruptcy) here complained of is not the discharge
of Radford's personal obligation. It is the taking of substantive
rights in specific property ....23

19 See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6142.
20 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (Supp. V 1981). The subsection provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section (363), at any time
on request of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased,

or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate
protection of such interest. In any hearing under this section, the trustee has
the burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection.
21 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 5835.
2

295 U.S. 555 (1935).

23

Id. at 589-90 (citations omitted).
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The Court further stated "the Fifth Amendment commands that,
however great the Nation's need, private property shall not be thus
taken even for a wholly public use without just compensation." ' 4
B.

The Nature of the Interest to be Protected

The principle that a secured creditor holds a property interest
which must be afforded protection is no longer disputed. However,
the extent to which the secured creditor must be afforded protection has been the subject of argument.
Section 361 requires protection for "an interest of an entity
in property." z Although it did not specifically define what an interest is, Congress provided some insight into the meaning of the
section.2 Congress recognized that the secured creditor should be
guaranteed the "benefit of his bargain" while also recognizing that
doing so would sometimes produce results inimical to chapter 11
and 13 proceedings and the broad-based policies of the Act. The
"benefit of the bargain" would, at a minimum, include the right
to repossess and enforce the lien in the property. Permitting the
exercise of this right would result directly in what section 362 seeks
to prevent-the piecemeal decimation of the debtor's estate.2 7
Congress foresaw the impracticality of this result and stated:
"Though the creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the
purpose of the section is to insure that the secured creditor receives
in value essentially what he bargained for." Judge Conrad Cyr,
in In re American Kitchen Foods," followed this intent when he
made it clear that the value of the secured lien, not the amount
of debt, is what is at stake when a creditor seeks protection of its
interest. An undersecured creditor, to the extent the debt exceeds
the value of the collateral, is afforded no greater protection than
the creditor without security.3
24 Id. at 602.

25 11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981).
2 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG.2 & AD. NEWS 6295.
7

Id.

2 Id. (emphasis added).
2 9 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 537, 2 B.C.D. 715 (Bankr. N.D. Me. 1976).
30 Congress, anticipating confusion, specifically eliminated the concept of the
"secured creditor" by focusing instead upon the nature of the claim, secured or unsecured.
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The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah
in In re Alyucan InterstateCorporation,31 as part of an excellent
analysis of the meaning of adequate protection, also discussed the

extent of the property interest requiring protection. The creditor32
in Alyucan sought relief from a section 362(d) automatic stay.
While the court found that the collateral value greatly exceeded
the amount of the debt,33 it also found that value was quickly de-

preciating and thus allowed repossession. Quoting Justice Douglas
in Wright v. Union Central Insurance Company 4 that "there is
no constitutional claim of a creditor to more than [the value of
the interest in property],"35 the court in Alyucan went on:
Thus the "interest in property" entitled to protection is not measured by the amount of the debt but by the value of the lien. A
mushrooming debt, through accrual of interest or otherwise, may
be immaterial, if the amount of the lien is not thereby increased,
while vicissitudes in the market, loss of insurance or other factors affecting the value of the lien are relevant to adequate protection. The purpose of adequate protection is to assure the recoverability of this value during the hiatus between petition and
plan, or in the event the reorganization is stillborn, between peti36
tion and dismissal.

The amount of the obligation, therefore, is irrelevant for adequate
protection purposes. The focus will always be on the collateral
and the multiple variables affecting its value since the value of

the lien is dependent upon the value of the collateral.
C.

Adequacy of Protection-Valuationand Compensation
The nature of the creditor's interest and the requirement that

the interest be protected are firmly established concepts. However,
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. V 1981). The unsecured claim can be "affected" by bankruptcy as can any other contract right. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295
U.S. at 555.
31 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).

32 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. V 1981).
33 If the collateral value exceeds the amount of the debt, the difference is, of course,
the debtor's equity. In bankruptcy parlance, at least for the purposes of adequate protection, the equity is referred to as the "equity cushion."
34 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
35 Id. at 278.
36 12 Bankr. at 808.
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the manner and adequacy of protection will continue to present
major problems, given the infinite number of facts and circumstances that may arise. It is the facts of each case, thoughtfully

weighed and not formulized, which determine adequate protection.37
Section 36138 of the Code defines three methods for providing
adequate protection:3 1) periodic cash payments, 2) replacement
liens and 3) any other method which will adequately protect the
interests in question. The first two methods are specific and definable and thus will be used whenever possible. However, Congress wisely enacted a catch-all provision in subsection 3 to give
the courts wide latitude in effectuating the broad remedial policies
of bankruptcy legislation. Congress intended section 361 to be illustrative only, not exclusive or exhaustive.4o This Congressional
policy and intent clearly shows that the courts must adopt a flexible attitude toward valuation of the protected interest, since implementation of adequate protection depends upon proper valuation.
Historically, valuation has been a vague and troublesome concept and has been the vehicle by which courts have reached the
desired results. For example, by focusing upon the principle that
a secured creditor's interest must be valued as if unaffected by
bankruptcy, the court in In re American Kitchen Foods4' salvaged a corporate reorganization plan. The creditor was secured

37 Id. at 813.
38 11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981). See text accompanying note 68 infra for the text
of the statute.
39 The House amendment to H.R. 8200 originally included a fourth method of pro-

viding adequate protection-affording the secured party an administrative expense priority.
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). This is a first level priority expense and the first
to be paid after secured creditors. Congress eliminated it because of the uncertainty of
whether the estate will have sufficient proceeds to pay administrative expenses in every
case. 124 CONG. REc. 11, 11089 (1978) (statement by Hon. Don Edwards); H.R. REP. No.
595, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6444. The concept
remains embodied in § 507(b), which provides that if, in fact, the protection proves to
be inadequate a claim resulting from the automatic stay is entitled to a first priority administrative expense.
40 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 338 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6295.
41 9 COTIER BANKR. CAS. 537 (Bankr. N.D. Me. 1976). This case was decided under
the old act; nonetheless, its principles apply to the new law.
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pursuant to Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code. According to Judge Cyr, an Article Nine creditor must dispose of the
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner which would result
in realization of fair market value. 42 Thus valued, the collateral
in the case has sufficient equity to support its continued use without
impairing the lien under Article Nine and therefore satisfied the
constitutional test which the trustee had to meet. 43
In enacting section 361, Congress recognized that a valuation
standard cannot be absolute:
Neither is it expected that the courts will construe the term value
to mean, in every case, forced sale liquidation value or full going concern value. There is wide latitude between those two extremes. In any particular case, especially a reorganization case,
the determination of which entity should be entitled to the difference between the going concern value and the liquidation
value must be based on equitable considerations based on the
facts of the case. It will frequently be based on negotiation between the parties. Only if they cannot agree will the court
44
become involved.
It is important to note that in many reorganization cases, survival
of the troubled concern is in the secured creditor's best interest.
Where the interests of the creditor and debtor thus coincide, the
two should be able to agree to a valuation of the collateral and
the protection it requires.
The thrust of the adequate protection requirement is to assure
maintenance of the value of the lien; it is, therefore, compensatory
in nature. 45 Periodic payments and lien replacement certainly
compensate for any decrease in the value of an interest in property. 46 It has been argued that section 361(3), the catchall provision, is also compensatory in origin. 47 Under this analysis, all
42 9 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. at 537. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1972). The secured party
must foreclose its lien in a commercially reasonable manner or be subjected to a penalty

under U.C.C. § 9-507 (1972).
43 Judge Cyr's constitutional analysis is similar to that contained in the legislative
history of the new act. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5963, 6295-96.
44 Id. at 6295-96.
45 In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. at 808.
46 See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981).
47 In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. at 811 n.15.
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forms and methods of adequate protection must be compensatory,
thereby ruling out the controversial "equity cushion"' 4 as the sole
means of adequate protection.
D.

When Adequate Protection Is Required

The Act mandates at least three situations when the trustee
or debtor-in-possession must afford adequate protection 49 to an
impaired lien holder. The first situation arises when the creditor is stayed from enforcing his lien. The mere filing of the petition triggers the automatic stay50 which prevents any act to enforce the lien of a creditor either through the judicial process or
self-help repossession. 5' The maintenance of this stay is contingent upon providing adequate protection under subsection
5
362(d) (1). 2
Although subsection 362(d) (1) plainly directs a court to modify
or terminate a stay when the creditor shows a lack of adequate
protection, subsection 362(d) (2) adds a confusing dimension to judicial considerations of the automatic stay. Section 362(d) in its
entirety provides:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing,
the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying or conditioning such stay(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an
interest in property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, if(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property;
and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization.5
This section distinguishes an "interest in property," protected by
subsection 362(d) (1), from "a stay of an act against property," pro48 For a discussion of the concept of "equity cushion," see notes 80-151 infra and
accompanying text.
49 11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981).

50 11 U.S.C. 362 (Supp. V 1981).
51 Id.
52

11 U.S.C.
11

§ 362(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981).

U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. V 1981).
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tected by subsection 362(d) (2). The latter subsection was enacted
to resolve the problem of real property mortgage foreclosures where
the bankruptcy petition is filed on the eve of foreclosure. 54 However, it has been noted that courts "have shown indifference on
this score and have applied (d)(1), which refers to adequate protection of an 'interest in property,' to relief from stay actions concerning property." ' An important result of this judicial indifference is that secured creditors are denied relief in situations where
the right to proceed under subsection (d)(2) with lien enforcement
is clear. If, for instance, a debtor files a petition in bankruptcy
a day or two prior to the foreclosure sale, it appears from the literal
reading of subsection 363(d)(2)56 that the debtor's ability to afford substantial periodic payments and even a replacement or an
additional lien would not be relevant in a hearing upon the creditor's petition to lift the automatic stay if 1) the debtor had no
equity and 2) the collateral was not necessary to an effective
reorganization. This argument could be applied with equal force
to personal property collateral such as equipment or inventory.
The second instance in which the secured creditor is entitled
to adequate protection occurs when the trustee exercises his or her
fundamental rights under section 3637 to sell or lease collateral
in which the secured party has an interest. Congress has indicated
that this provision applies with more force in reorganization cases
in which the continuation of the concern is indispensible to the
survival of the plan than in liquidation cases. 5'
Prior bankruptcy law did not contain comparable provisions.
However, section 36351 which codifies and reaffirms case law,
recognizes that if reorganization chapters are to provide viable,
remedial relief, the trustee must have a great deal of discretion
to deal with the property of the estate. This results in considerable
54 124 CONG. BEc. H11089, H11092 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) statement of Rep. Edwards), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 6435, 6445.
a In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. at 811 n.17. See note 92 infra for a
review of some of the cases in which the distinction between subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2)
of section 362 has been confused.
56 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
57 11 U.S.C. § 363 (Supp. V 1981).
58H.R. REP.No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6143.
59 11 U.S.C. § 363 (Supp. V 1981).
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exposure for secured creditors when that property happens to be
collateral for their loans. Recognizing this, Congress enacted section 363 as "protection for both the debtor in operation of his business, and the secured creditor, in its interest in the property
used."6o Section 363 does make important distinctions between
the types of collateral affected, 6' between sales in and out of the
ordinary course of business62 and among types of interests protected. 3 Whatever the type of collateral, proposed disposition or
interest at stake, the entity affected is entitled to adequate protection under section 363(e).64
The third circumstance under which an entity with an interest
must be afforded adequate protection is contained in section
3646 which provides in part:
(c) If the trustee is unable to obtain unsecured credit allowable
under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize
the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt(1) with priority over any or all administrative expenses of
the kind specified in section 503(b) or 507(b) of this title;
(2) secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not
otherwise subject to a lien; or
(3) secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that
is subject to a lien.

60 H.R. REP.No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 5963, 6142.

11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981) distinguishes between "cash collateral" and
all other types of collateral. "Cash" collateral is defined as "cash, negotiable instruments,
documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents." 11 U.S.C. §
363(a) (Supp. V 1981).
62 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981) permits the trustee to sell or lease property
of the estate in the ordinary course of business so long as the business is authorized to be
operated under 11 U.S.C. § 721 (Supp. V 1981) (liquidation), 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (Supp.
V 1981) (reorganization) or 11 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. V 1981) (wage earners).
63 11 U.S.C. § 363(e)-(h) (Supp. V 1981).
64 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (Supp. V 1981). This subsection provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request
of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold or leased, by the trustee, the court shall prohibit or
condition such use, sale or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest. In any hearing under this section, the trustee has the
burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection.
65 11 U.S.C. § 364 (Supp. V 1981).
61

KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

(d) (1) The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize
the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt secured
by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that
is subject to a lien only if(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise;
and
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the
holder of the lien on the property of the estate on
which such senior or equal lien is proposed to be
granted.
(2) In any hearing under this subsection, the trustee has the
burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection.66
The operative elements of this section contemplate a battle
between an existing secured creditor and a prospective one for unused equity in the same collateral. Any new creditor would demand and receive a superpriority which the trustee could grant
67
only if adequate protection is afforded to the existing creditor.
Given the nature of the debtor's economic circumstances, the likelihood of excess equity is remote. Hence, the vulnerability of a
secured creditor seems minimal.
II.

COMMERCIAL REALITIES AND

JUDICIAL

INTERPRETATIONS

OF ADEQUATE PROTECTION

The concept of adequate protection is defined in section 361
of the Act as follows:
When adequate protection is required under section 362,
363, or 364 of this title of an interest of an entity in property,
such adequate protection may be provided by(1) requiring the trustee to make periodic cash payments
to such entity, to the extent that the stay under section 362
of this title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of this title,
or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title results
in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such
property;

66 11 U.S.C. § 364(c), (d) (Supp. V 1981).
6

CONG.

S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE

& AD. NEWS 5787, 5844.
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(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant
results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in
such property; or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such
entity to compensation allowable under sectioni 503(b) (1) of
this title as an administrative expense, as will result in the
realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of
such entity's interest in such property.68
Congressional policy underlying the enactment of section 361 is
clearly reflected in subsection (3). That policy was to allow trustees,
and ultimately the courts, almost unfettered discretion to carry
out the broad purposes of the Act.69
A.

The Effect of Commercial Realities

Unfortunately, from the perspectives of both the creditor and
debtor, the realities of bankruptcy proceedings usually result in
that which Congress intended to avoid-a dramatically limited
ability to protect secured creditors whose interests will be affected
by the bankruptcy proceedings. The secured creditor's argument
is that his interest in the debtor's property can be adequately protected only by permitting enforcement of the lien. Any protection short of that will be regarded as inimical to his best interests.
Conversely, the typical debtor will have unbounded faith in his
ability to survive and thereafter prosper, a result which will protect the interests of all creditors. The truth lies somewhere between
these two extremes.
Ideally, to protect the secured creditor, a debt should be repaid
with periodic payments7 and the collateral securing the debt

68 11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981).
69 The legislative history states that it is the function of the debtor and trustee to

propose the plan of adequate protection and that the court's role is to review only its adequacy. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 338 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONe. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6295. Nothing in the legislative history suggests, however, that
the court cannot supplement the plan with its own ideas in the interest of an equitable
result which ultimately is the protection of all creditors, not only the secured creditor.
70 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (Supp. V 1981). Ideally, the periodic payments would equal
the contractual payments.
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should be property in which the debtor has sufficient equity. Bankruptcy, however, simply does not present ideal situations. Rarely
will a debtor have sufficient equity in collateral or be able to make
periodic payments of any significance. This is especially so in
chapter 11 reorganization proceedings where most assets are quickly depreciating equipment and inventory. In contrast, in a chapter
13 wage earner proceeding, where the largest secured creditor generally will be a residential mortgagee, there is a greafer possibility of substantial equity. The prospect of this "cushion of equity"
7
may in itself suffice as adequate protection. '
Generally, an economically troubled debtor cannot make periodic payments large enough to compensate for the decreased value
of the secured party's interest resulting from the automatic stay
or from the use of the collateral. The decrease in the value of the
collateral is a natural result of depreciation, a factor considered
by the creditor before extending credit and fixing the amortization schedule. Consequently, to compensate fully for the decrease
in value, the payments will have to equal the contractual amount.
Yet one of the primary circumstances forcing a debtor to seek relief
in bankruptcy is inability to meet its contractual obligations as
they mature. Although the creditor in most cases is not necessarily entitled to the contractual amount 72 as adequate protection,
the greater the divergence from the contract obligation by the debtor, the less likely it is that payment will be available as adequate
protection.
A replacement or additional lien is a second method of adequate protection offered by section 361. 7a However, the assets of
the typical chapter 11 debtor will be so heavily encumbered that
little or no equity remains to secure other liens. Only in rare
cases74 will section 361(2) be used by the debtor or trustee.

71 For a discussion of the concept of "equity cushion," see notes 80-151 infra and
accompanying text.
72 E.g., In re A & A Transport, Inc., 10 Bankr. 867 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
73 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (Supp. V 1981).
74 See In re American Kitchen Foods, 9 COLLIER BANK. CAs. 537,in which Judge
Cyr, dealing with the old act, discussed the concept of "impairment of lien," a concept
similar to the adequate protection of an "interest of an entity." In the case, he was able
to offer the creditors a valuable, totally unencumbered asset as additional collateral.
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There remains, then, the "indubitable equivalent" alternative

of section 361(3). 75 This concept was first discussed by Judge
Learned Hand in In re Muriel Holding Corp.:76
It is plain that "adequate protection" must be completely com[A creditor] wishes to get his money or at least
pensatory ....
the property. We see no reason to suppose that the statute was
intended to deprive him of that in the interest of junior holders,
unless by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.77

Judge Hand used the word "substitute" whereas section 361(3)
speaks of "such other relief."78 Both reflect congressional policy

and, in a sense, define the concept without limiting its application in any way. Thus, the debtor must devise ways under any
or all of the three subsections of section 361 to protect interests
79
of secured creditors as well as its own interests.

B.

Adequate Protection and the "Equity Cushion"

Subsection (3) of section 361 is then of vital importance. It
is here, if at all, that the trustee has the flexibility to maneuver
and fashion arguments for the court's consideration. The trustee's
response has generally been to rely on an "equity cushion," the

amount by which the value of the collateral exceeds the debt. 80
Given the importance of this concept to the orderly functioning
of reorganizational proceedings, it is vital for courts to develop
minimal standards and guidelines regarding what constitutes an

acceptable equity cushion.81

75 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (Supp. V 1981).

76 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).

77 Id. at 942.
78 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (Supp. V 1981). See text accompanying note 68 supra for the
full text of the section.
79 It should be safe to assume that the Bankruptcy Commission, had it been able
to devise other specific methods of adequate protection, would have listed them in § 361.
80 This "equity cushion" must be distinguished from equity in assets other than the
secured creditor's collateral.
81 That Congress intended maximum flexibility is apparent from the legislative history which states: "It is expected that the courts will apply the concept [of adequate protection] in light of facts of each case and general equitable principles." H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6295.
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The standard for an acceptable equity cushion must incorporate two fundamental concepts: 1) maximum judicial flexibility;
and 2) recognition of the difference between chapter 11 and chapter 13 proceedings. In chapter 13 proceedings, the collateral will
generally be the debtor's residence. The secured party will be seeking to foreclose on the mortgage. The value of the collateral is
readily fixed and controlled by a constant market; the amount of
debt is always known.82 Chapter 11 reorganization plans, however, present a strikingly different picture. There are many types
of collateral, and a single security agreement can have varying
combinations of collateral. The reasons for retention and use of
the collateral can vary with each plan. In contrast to the collateral
of a chapter 13 debtor, the equity cushion is less readily determined because the value of the collateral is less controlled by a
constant market. The determination of the adequacy of the equity for adequate protection purposes thus becomes an allocation
of risk between the competing interests of the debtor and creditor
and is perhaps the most crucial function the court performs, especially in the early stages of bankruptcy. Reaching an equitable
resolution of this problem certainly maximizes the chances for survival of the plan. Absent such resolution, the trustee may be forced
to relinquish the property,83 thereby jeopardizing the debtor's
plan of reorganization and the interests of the remaining creditors.
Formulating any standards in bankruptcy must include a balancing of the interests of the secured creditor against the remedial
purposes of the bankruptcy laws.84 The latter consideration suggests, especially early in the proceedings, a balancing of equities
in favor of the debtor so as to effectuate the underlying bankruptcy
policy of rehabilitation. Realistically, though, this process must
also reflect the recognition that a creditor who is secured became
so through a bargaining process resulting in an equity figure deter-

82 Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981), if there is no equity and the property is not necessary for reorganization, the stay must be lifted. It can be argued that the
residence of an individual debtor under 11 U.S.C. ch. 13 (Supp. V 1981) is always necessary
for reorganizations; thus, the focus would always be upon the presence or absence of equity.
83 Without adequate protection, the stay must be lifted. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp.
V 1981).
84 Massari, Adequate Protection Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, ANNuAL SUrvEY
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 174, 189 (1979).
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mined essentially by exigencies of the parties and of the market
place. Bankruptcy intervenes when the creditor's secured interest
is buffered by a collateral-to-debt ratio either the same as negotiated or reduced by external events over which the creditor
theoretically had control. It is this interest, the collateral-to-debt
ratio figure at the time of the hearinge on the issue of adequate
protection, which requires protection. It is not the business of the
courts to protect a creditor from the uncertainties of the marketplace or from his own neglect in failing to police his collateral.
If, at hearing time, the collateral-to-debt ratio is infact sufficient to protect the secured party's interest, then the stay should
remain in effect. Where the ratio is not less than that "bargained
for" plus a reasonable buffer,8 6 an equity cushion without more
theoretically should afford adequate protection. s7 Although this
kind of protection is not compensatory in nature,88 it realistically offers the balanced protection between creditor and debtor
which section 361 contemplates. Any equity of less than the "bargained for ratio" plus a reasonable buffer should be coupled with
additional protection either by payments to reduce the debt or
by providing additional collateral, if possible.89
The equity question cannot be resolved without a valuation
of the property. Valuation is an imprecise and somewhat arbitrary
process usually involving consideration of conflicting expert appraisals which reflect the "wishes" of the parties rather than actual value. The result is often a compromise figure lying somewhere
between the two conflicting appraisals, thus pleasing no one. Nonetheless, the compromise is itself an integral part of the balancing of interests since it generally is struck somewhere between a
"going concern" value (fair market value) and a "forced sale"
value (generally the value on sale by an economically depressed
debtor) .90
85 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (Supp. V 1981) entitles a creditor to a hearing on the issue
of adequate protection whenever he deems his interests jeopardized.
86 Massari, supra note 84, at 189.
87 See In re Gaslight Village, Inc., 8 Bankr. 866, 871 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) and
numerous other citations contained therein. While a few courts have subscribed to this
concept, most require more than an equity cushion.
'8For a discussion of the concept of "indubitable equivalence," see text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
89 Massari, supra note 84, at 187.
90 See In re American Kitchen Foods, 9 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 537, for an excellent

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

Congress intended maximum flexibility in valuation as is reflected in the House Report:
This section [11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981)] does not specify
how value is to be determined, nor does it specify when it is to
be determined. These matters are left to case-by-case interpretation and development. It is expected that the courts will apply
the concept in light of facts of each case and generalequitable
principles. It is not intended that the courts will develop a hard
and fast rule that will apply in every case. The time and method
of valuation is not specified precisely, in order to avoid that result. There are an infinite number of variations possible in dealig between debtors and creditors, the law is continually developing, and new ideas are continually being implemented in this
field. The flexibility is important to permit the courts to adapt
to varying circumstances and changing modes of financing. 91

C. Judicial Treatment of the Equity Cushion and Adequate
Protection
Legislative history notwithstanding, adequate protection will
be whatever a given court concludes it is with respect to the facts

at hand. The courts seem to be balancing interests of the debtor
and creditor wherever possible, and to do so they must discuss the
equity cushion because it is upon this cushion that the foundation
of adequate protection is built.92 As a result, discussions of the

discussion of these two valuation standards.
91 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1978) (emphasis added), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6295 (emphasis added).
92 See In re High Sky, Inc., 15 Bankr. 332 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1981); Pennsylvania
State Employees Retirement Fund v. Roane, 14 Bankr. 542 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In
re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 10 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. C.D. Cal 1981); In re Accent Associates, Inc., 8 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); In re Pleasant Valley, Inc.,
6 Bankr. 13 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980).
The courts in these cases blur the distinction between subsection (d)(1) and subsection (d)(2) of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of this distinction, see text
accompanying notes 54-56 supra. The court in In re PleasantValley, Inc., for example,
discussed in detail the two conjunctive elements of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981)
even though the case apparently did not involve the "stay of an act against property."
Although the court was correct in saying that the equity cushion is a factor under both
subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. V 1981), there appears to be no
basis for considering the indispensability of property to the reorganization under subsection (d)(1) unless as an element of "for cause." If it is such an element, the court did not
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equity cushion as an integral part of adequate protection pervade
court opinions. Even though courts occasionally conclude that the
cushion, standing alone, can afford adequate protection, 93 relatively few cases have not required more. An interesting illustration of a court's reluctance to regard the cushion as adequate pro4
tection without more is found in In re First Century Trust Co.
The facts reveal equity sufficient to protect a second mortgage seeking to foreclose. The court, however, called the circumstances
"unique," and instead of simply denying the mortgagee's request
to lift the stay on the equity basis, denied the stay, saying that
to do otherwise would imperil priority and unsecured creditors.95
In fact, there is nothing unique about protecting unsecured and
priority creditors; it is one of the primary reasons for allowing
chapter 11 reorganizations, although this protection is often
couched within the language that the property is necessary for an
effective reorganization.9
One factor which might explain why courts usually link other
protection with the equity cushion is the language of section 361
which appears to mandate affirmative action of some kind: subsection (1) "requiring ... cash payments"; subsection (2) "provid-

ing.., such equity"; subsection (3) "granting"such relief. 97 this
language and the courts' application of it are consistent with the
concept that adequate protection must be compensatory in nature
and that equity alone is not enough. 98
1.

Decisions Finding Adequate Protection
of Real Estate Collateral

Cases where the adequate protection of a creditor's interest
have been found reveal nothing particularly startling or innovative.

say so, although the creditor seemed to be alleging it as an element in his request for relief
under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
93 Curtis v. Delaware Valley Say. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Bankr. 110, 112 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1981) (citing five cases reaching the same conclusion). The court in Curtis found the
equity cushion to be completely compensatory in nature. Id.
94 12 Bankr. 204 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1981).
95 Id. at 209.
96 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
97 11 U.S.C. § 361(1), (2), (3) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
98 See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra for a discussion of this principle.
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Some examples of adequate protection are: FHA insured mortgage
and periodic payments to both the mortgagee and FHA;09 equity
cushion, periodic payments and a federally insured mortgage; 0 0
equity cushion and periodic payments upon the mortgage to the
trustee under the plan and directly to the mortgagee;10' equity
02
cushion and periodic payments.
Occasionally, a court has found adequate protection in the
absence of an equity cushion, but usually upon stringent conditions or under unique circumstances. The court in In re Pleasant
Valley, Inc.,1°3 took judicial notice of the impact of inflation
upon real. property values and conditioned the continuation of the
stay upon payment of all taxes, insurance and interest, provision
of additional security and a showing of reasonable indispensability
of the collateral to the survival of the plan.
No equity cushion was involved in In re El Patio, Ltd. oW
The
collateral was an apartment complex undergoing condominium
conversion. The creditor, a bank, had contracted with the debtor on an unsecured basis after zoning problems temporarily
suspended the conversion. The court found adequate protection
and continued the stay for 120 days, concludihg that the creditor
had "bargained to share the entrepreneurial risk for one year."1
(The 120 days concluded that one year.) Clearly the deciding factor
was that the bank should be held to its own bargain and that the
continuation of the stay added no risk beyond what was voluntarily assumed by the bank when the deal was struck.

99 In re Roane, 8 Bankr. 997 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981), affl'd, 14 Bankr. 542 (E.D.
Pa. 1981).
100 Commonwealth of Pa. State Employees' Retirement Fund v. Roane, 14 Bankr.
at 542.
101
102

In re Pannell, 12 Bankr. 51 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
In re Barkley-Cupit Enters., Inc., 13 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981), affd,

677 F.2d 112 (Bankr. 5th Cir. 1982). Here, although there were sufficient equity and periodic payments, lifting the stay would have given the creditors a considerable windfall.
The creditor, a lessor-optioner, would have been the beneficiary of a substantial equity
from the defaulting debtor, a lessee-optionee, since the value of the real estate greatly
exceeded the option purchase price specified in the lease. The equity cushion appeared
to be less of a factor in the denial than the prospective windfall. 13 Bankr. at 92.
103 6 Bankr. at 13.
104 6 Bankr. 518 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980).
105 Id. at 523.
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The court also found a creditor's interest protected absent an
equity cushion in In re Roselli.10" There, the creditor was the
mortgagee of a federally insured mortgage. However, since the
court granted relief from the stay under section 362(d)(2)107 despite adequate protection, the weight of the finding of no cushion
cannot be fairly assessed.
2.

Cases Involving Adequate Protection
of PersonalProperty Collateral

In each of the cases discussed above, the collateral was real
estate which constituted the sole or primary asset of the business.
While real estate can be leased or sold, it cannot be "consumed."108 The risks to a secured creditor are therefore known
and relatively fixed. Equity is of paramount concern and depreciation is generally not a factor.
These factors change dramatically when the interest to be protected is in personal property. Typically the proceeding will be
a chapter 11 reorganization. The collateral will be fixtures, stock,
inventory, accounts or proceeds and, frequently, all of these will
be the subject matter of the same secured transaction. The chance
that the collateral will be consumed or lost will be constant and
real. Here, rapid depreciation of equipment and fixtures, as well
as consumption of inventory and proceeds, is of primary concern.
When the vexatious question of valuation is added to the foregoing concerns, the issue of adequately protecting the creditor becomes troublesome indeed. Further, these kinds of collateral form
the nucleus for many businesses and, thus, nearly always will be
necessary for reorganization and will prevent granting relief from
the stay under section 362(d)(2).109
All of these variables naturally attendant to moveable and consumable collateral render rigid formulae and inflexible standards
106 10 Bankr. 665 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
107 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981). The property was not indispensable to

the reorganization. 10 Bankr. at 667.
108 11 U.S.C. § 363 (Supp. V 1981) anticipates every possible disposition of collateral,
including consumption.
109 Again, if the petition to lift the stay is brought under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp.
V 1981), the only issue is adequate protection, and not the indispensability to reorganization, unless considered as an element in the phrase "for cause."
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meaningless. The approach the court should take is one of restraint
and patience. Hasty action is likely to result in no benefit, and
the probable death of a business when the possibility of a successful
reorganization remains." 0
The circumstances under which courts have found adequate
protection of a creditor's interest in personalty are as varied as
the types of businesses involved; and although the concept of an
equity cushion may be fleeting or even illusory, it nevertheless plays
a vital role. In re Wheeler"' presented the classic chapter 11 scenario. The collateral was a single piece of equipment, a log skidder. The debtor worked as a logger, and the equipment was essential to an effective reorganization. The equity cushion was negligible-less than $1,000. Although the debtor had been making
monthly payments sufficient to keep the creditor fully secured,
the credit was concerned about depreciation of the asset and erosion of the equity cushion.112 The question before the court appeared to be whether the periodic payment had to equal the contractual amount, an amount equal to actual depreciation, or an
amount somewhere in between. Rejecting the creditor's argument
that adequate protection required the contractual payment, the
court interpreted section 361 to mean:
that the debtor has given proper assurance to the creditor that
the latter's interest in the collateral is protected while the right
of possession is denied to the creditor ....

Yet at the same time,

adequate protection does not necessarily mean that the secured
creditor is put in the same position it was in when it initially
negotiated the transaction." 3

This last conclusion is vital with respect to personalty, the depreciation of which quickly erodes the equity which existed when the
deal was struck. Consequently, affording adequate protection even
though little or no equity exists is fundamental to the survival of
chapter 11 as a viable alternative to liquidation.
The determination of the equity cushion where personal property is involved can be a tortured and convoluted process. The
11"

See In re Wheeler, 12 Bankr. 908, 910 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).

"l

Id.

Id. at 909.
113 Id. (citation omitted).
112
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burden of proof on the issue belongs to the creditor."4 In re A &
A Transport, Inc." 5 is an interesting portrayal of how far a result-oriented court will go. The collateral in this instance was two
trucks which the court indicated, without specifically finding, were
necessary to reorganizational efforts.116 The debt on the date the
petition was filed exceeded $24,000. The value of the collateral
was $14,000 based upon the debtor's own stated values set forth
under oath on its Schedule of Debts. The creditor relied upon the
debtor's stated valuation, assuming he had met his burden of proof.
The court, however, accepted the debtor's expert appraisal value
of $34,000 and found a substantial equity cushion, concluding that
n7
the creditor failed to sustain his burden on the issue of equity.
Dismissing the debtor's "stated value" as an arbitrary figure offered in haste to file the petition, the court concluded:
As a result, it is possible that the "scheduled value" and the actual "market value" may differ substantially. This court has always relied more heavily upon the appraisals of experts in valuing property than on debtors whose estimates may bear no relationship to reality. I have often said that there is no more elusive
term in the English language than the word "value.""'
While the last comment may be somewhat hyperbolic, it does
reflect the continuing uncertainty surrounding the issue of adequate protection, especially valuation. If precise value is unascertainable, then necessarily, so too is adequate protection. To compound matters, the court in In re A & A Transport,Inc. gratuitously offered its opinion why values stated even under oath should
be disregarded, although apparently no evidence was before the
court to support the conclusion that the stated values had no basis
in fact. Certainly it was crucial to the debtor to keep the trucks
and to do so, the higher appraisal values were necessary. It is arguable, however, that spontaneously stated values may well be
114 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The creditor has the burden of proof with
respect to the issue of lack of equity.
115 10 Bankr. at 867.
116 The court could have dispensed with the equity issue if it had found the collateral
was necessary for reorganization. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981) only one
of the two factors need be present to deny relief from the automatic stay.
11710 Bankr. at 869-70.

11 Id. at 869.
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more closely related to reality than values affixed after time for
reflection. Faced with such convoluted reasoning, there should
be little wonder why creditors regard the issue of adequate protection as a major problem throughout the life of the plan.
In re A & A Transport,Inc. is a case where the creditor presented no evidence of value. What about the situation where both
parties present conflicting evidence of value? The court in In re
Heatron, Inc.19 faced this problem and concluded that, at least
in the early stages of reorganization, the court should resolve the
issue in favor of the debtor.12 Although the court cited no authority for its conclusion, its decision is consistent with the "no
early death knell" policy set forth by the Wheeler court.'2 ' The
Heatroncourt also faced the question of valuation, called it crucial
and then subscribed to the "commercially reasonable" standard
of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code. 22 This standard translates into the "fair market" or "going concern" value
which was exhaustively analyzed by Judge Cyr in In re American
Kitchen Foods, Inc. s3
In Heatronthe collateral was equipment, fixtures, tools, accounts and inventory, existing and after acquired.2 4The creditor
claimed there was insufficient protection to permit the debtor to
use cash collateral,l12 a particularly sensitive prospect for credtors. The court disagreed and found a sufficient equity cushion
in other collateral to support the debtor's use of cash collateral,
but only under the following strict conditions: certified monthly
statements; weekly reports of new accounts; running accounts of
inventory and of equipment purchased or sold; periodic payments
on principal; and payment of interest, taxes and rent. 26

"9 6 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
'20 Id. at 496.
121 12 Bankr. at 910. See text accompanying notes 111-113 supra for a discussion

of Wheeler.
122 6 Bankr. at 495.
123 9 COLLIER BA Ka. CAS. at 537. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text for

a discussion of In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc.
6 Bankr. at 493.
11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (Supp. V 1981) defines cash collateral as "cash, negotiable
instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts or other cash equivalents."
'2 6 Bankr. at 496-97.
12

'25
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Courts must impose strict controls in instances where cash collateral is used in order to encourage the giving of credit and investment. It is natural for a creditor to become nervous when its
debtor seeks bankruptcy relief. The anxiety increases when the
creditor's collateral is sold and its replacement, cash or its equivalent, is diverted elsewhere.127 Congress recognized this by enacting section 363(c)(2)las which prohibits the use of cash collateral without a hearing, absent creditor consent.
Other combinations of factors found to constitute adequate
protection include the following: equipment necessary for reorganization; an equity cushion of between $61,000-$81,000 requiring a payment of $35,000 within sixty days;'29 stock collateral
necessary for reorganization; 130 and an equity cushion sufficient
to support the use of cash collateral for ninety days without payments to the creditor131
In re American Mariner Industries, Inc. 32 is one of the few
cases in which a court has summarily dismissed the discussion of
equity as irrelevant. Instead, the court concluded that the collateral
was indispensable to effective reorganization and ordered periodic
payments to compensate for any depreciation or depletion of the
collateral.13 The court was correct that lack of equity is irrelevant under section 362(d)(2)34 with respect to a stay of an act
against the property where there is a specific finding of necessity
for reorganization. However, the court spoke only in terms of relief
based on inadequate protection, which is governed by section
362(d)(1)ss and under which the issue is adequate protection.
Equity here is not only relevant, but crucial. The court's reasoning illustrates how the distinction between these two sections is
blurred. 136 The requirement of periodic payments, however, is
127 For a judicial recognition of this anxiety, see In re Xinde Int'l, Inc., 13 Bankr.
212, 215 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
'28 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
129 In re 5-Leaf Clover Corp., 6 Bankr. 463 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980).
130 In re Robson, 10 Bankr. 362 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981).
131 In re Xinde Int'l, Inc., 13 Bankr. at 212.
132 10 Bankr. at 711.
133 Id. at 714.
134 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
135 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
136 See note 92 and text accompanying notes 55-56 supra for a discussion of this blurring of distinction.
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consistent with a request for relief based on inadequate protec-

tion under section 362(d)(1). 137
3.

Decisions Finding Inadequate Protection

The primary concern of the courts in cases finding inadequate
protection is the question of equity since its absence indicates a
lack of adequate protection. The court in In re Accent Associates,
Inc. ,'-1 found no equity whatsoever and no reasonable possibility of effective reorganization within a reasonable time. The court
adopted the evidence of lower valuations, apparently influenced
by the fact that no reasonable plan of reorganization had been
offered. The court apparently concluded that, given the long delay
in filing the reorganization plan and the bleak prospects for reorganization, a continuation of the stay would be inequitable and
prejudicial to the creditor.,39 Conversely, conflicts raised early in
the proceedings are likely to be resolved in favor of the debtor and
40
reorganization.
In In re Presock,14 1 the court found no equity cushion and
lifted the stay despite a federally insured mortgage which, the
142
court concluded, did not of itself equal adequate protection.
Prompting the result in this case was the fact that the debtor had
not made a single payment on the mortgage since its creation.'4
A debt of $606,000, partially secured by property valued at
$350,000 coupled with no plan of reorganization resulted in a holding of inadequate protection in In re High Sky, Inc.144The collateral there was a 435-acre tract of mountain land intended as
an ecologically balanced private community. Although the speculative nature of the project troubled the court, its primary con145
cern was the lack of equity cushion.

137
138
139
140
141
142
143

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
8 Bankr. at 933.
Id. at 936-37.
See text accompanying notes 119-21 supra for a discussion of this principle.
9 Bankr. 676 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
See also In re Heath, 9 Bankr. 665 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
9 Bankr. at 678.

144 15 Bankr. at 332.
145 Id. at 336-37.
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An initial finding of sufficient equity was vacated by the court
in In re Gaslight Village, Inc. 146 because of a continuing erosion
of the cushion caused by, among other factors, the debtor's failure
to file a plan of reorganization for fourteen months. The debtor
here offered additional "protection" in the form of junior liens
on apartment complex equipment, including refrigerators. The
court concluded that this junior lienholder status was "cold comfort" to the creditor. 47
In instances where the collateral is personal property, the focus
also has been upon equity. The collateral in In re Penn York Mfg.,
Inc.' 48 was equipment and accounts. The court found not only a
lack of equity, but also a deficiency. No payment had been made
on the indebtedness since its inception, and therefore the debtor's
proposal to pay the interest did not quality as "periodic cash payments equivalent to a decrease in value."' 49 Also, there was no
realistic prospect for a successful rehabilitation under chapter 11.
Finally, an automobile valued at $5,000 encumbered by a debt
of twice that amount prompted a lifting of the stay in In re
Daws 1 when the Only ray of hope was the debtor's promise to
pay, a promise made previously but not kept. Similar cases where
courts concluded protection was lacking show no significant digressions from the reasoning and conclusions of the above cases. 15'
CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy process, by its nature, precludes creditors and
debtors from a harmonious existence. The process with respect to
them is adversarial; bankruptcy forces their diametrically opposed interests into direct conflict, thereby raising issues frequently
incapable of equitable resolution. The Bankruptcy Court as a court
of equity is charged by Congress, through the enactment of sec-

14 8 Bankr. at 866.
147 Id. at 871.

14 Bankr. 51 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1981).
at 53.
15013 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1981).
151See, e.g., In re P.K. Fox Corp., 12 Bankr. 134 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re
Britton, 9 Bankr. 245 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Pritchett, 8 Bankr. 647 (Bankr. N.D.
MI1.1981).
148

149Id.
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tion 361,152 with the mandate to protect these competing interests
while preserving the remedial nature of the proceedings. This is
a formidable task indeed. The concept of adequate protection is
amorphous and vague and, if applied capriciously or arbitrarily,
will result in irreparable harm. Evidence indicates that the courts
have handled the issue with a healthy degree of sensitivity to the
interests of all. The results thus far argue well for the maintenance
of a viable, effective bankruptcy process in which credit can be
safely extended and expectations reasonably fulfilled.

152 11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981).

